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was not substantial when balanced against
the compelling interest of both the state
and the defendant in the accurate disposition of a case. In Ake, the state argued
that a requirement to provide a defendant
with psychiatric assistance would result
in a staggering burden. The Court rejected the argument that such a requirement would place an unbearable economic
burden on the state, noting that the federal government and many states currently
make psychiatric assistance available to
indigent defendants and they have not
found the economic burden too great so
as to preclude psychiatric assistance. Furthermore, the Court argued that this is
particularly true when the obligation of
the state is limited to providing only one
competent psychiatrist.
In applying the third factor-assessing
the probable value of psychiatric assistance and the risk of error if it is deniedthe Court determined that, when the state
makes a defendant's mental condition
relevant to his criminal culpability and
subsequent punishment, the assistance of
a psychiatrist may well be crucial to a
proper defense. The Court found this
proposition to be reflected in the fact that
more than forty states have decided, either
through legislation or judicial decision,
that indigent defendants are entitled to
the assistance of a psychiatrist under certain circumstances. (It is interesting to
note that Maryland is not one of these
forty states.) Additionally, the federal
government has provided that indigent
defendants shall receive the assistance of
all experts "necessary for an adequate defense." Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3006A(e) (1970). Hence, "without the
assistance of a psychiatrist to conduct a
professional examination on issues relevant to the defense, to help determine
whether the insanity defense is viable, to
present testimony, and to assist in preparing the cross-examination of a State's psychiatric witnesses," the Court concluded
that "the risk of an inaccurate resolution
ofinsanity issues is extremely high." Ake,
104 S.Ct. at 1096. Moreover, the risk of
error is particularly great when a defendant's mental condition is seriously in
question. Therefore, the Court decided
that the need for the assistance of a p~
chiatrist is readily apparent when a defendant is able to make an ex parte threshold
showing to the trial court that his sanity is
likely to be an important factor in his defense. As a result of this finding, the Court
held that when a defendant demonstrates
to the trial court that his sanity at the time
of the offense is to be a significant factor
at trial, the state "must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent

psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the
defense." Ake, 104 S.Ct. at 1097. The
Court warns, however, that this does not
mean that an indigent defendant has a
constitutional right to choose a psychiatrist of his personal liking or to receive
funds to hire his own. Consequently, the
Court left the determination of how to
implement this right to the states.
Finally, the Court held that if a state
presents psychiatric evidence as to a defendant's future dangerousness, the indigent defendant has an additional right
to a psychiatrist's assistance at the sentencing phase of his trial as well. If this
were not true, a defendant could not offer
a well-informed expert's opposing view
and he would thereby lose an important
opportunity to raise questions in the
jurors' minds regarding the state's proof of
an aggravating factor. Thus, the Court
decided that at capital sentencing proceedings, "where the consequence of error
is so great, the relevance of responsive
psychiatric testimony so evident, and the
burden on the state so slim, due process
requires access to psychiatric examination
on relevant issues, to the testimony of the
psychiatrist, and to assistance in preparation at the sentencing phase." Ake, 104
S.Ct. at 1097.
Justice Rehnquist dissented in Ake arguing that the Court's holding should be
limited to capital cases. Additionally, the
dissent argued that it should be made
clear that the entitlement is to an independent psychiatric evaluation and not to
a defense consultant.
- Jenmfer Hammond

Evans v. Evans: EXPANDING
VISITATION RIGHTS
Earlier this year, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that a trial court is authorized to award visitation rights to the nonadoptive stepmother of a minor child.
Evans v. Evans, 302 Md. 334, 488 A.2d
157 (1985). This decision reversed an unpublished opinion by the Court of Special
Appeals, and concluded that a 1981 amendment to the statute granting equity courts
jurisdiction over the custody and visitation
of a child did not affect well established
law authorizing the courts great discretion
to award visitation, provided the best interests of the child are served.
Appellant and appellee were married in
June of 1975. For six months prior to the
marriage, the appellee's son by a previous
marriage was under the care of the appellant. The parties separated in January of

1980, but Jason, then six years old, remained under the appellant's care for
seven months following the separation. In
August of 1980, Jason went to live with his
father. The parties filed cross-complaints
for divorce and the appellant requested
liberal visitation rights with Jason, which
were granted by th~ Circuit Court for
Prince George's County.
On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals
examined the 1981 amendment to section
3-602 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code, which
confers upon the court the authority to
consider petitions for visitation rights by
grandparents of a child of divorced parents.
The Court of Special Appeals concluded
that the inclusion of this amendment was a
reflection of the legislature's intent to limit
the discretionary power of equity courts to
determine who should be vested with child
visitation rights.

The Court of Appeals based its reversal
on an exhaustive review of the relevant
statutory and decisional law. It first concluded that the granting of child visitation
rights within a divorce decree was well
established in Maryland, citing Prangle v.
Prangle, 134 Md. 166, 106 A. 337 (1919).
Although the specific statutory provisions referred only to child "custody" and
"guardianship," Prangle and subsequent
decisions interpreted them to implicitly
encompass visitation rights. See, Hild v.
Hild, 221 Md. 349, 157 A.2d 442 (1960);
Barnard v. Godfrey, 157 Md. 264, 145 A.
614 (1929). Furthermore, the current statutory scheme explicitly grants equity courts
jurisdiction over child visitation rights. MD.
FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 1-201 (a)(6)
(1984).
Secondly, the court traced the history of
section 3-602, noting that when section
3-602 was recodified in 1975 it deleted language specifying those who could petition
the court for child custody, (i.e. father,
mother, relative, next of kin, next friend,
or any public official). Following these deFal4 1985/The Law Forum-IS

letions, the statute read: "A court of equity
has jurisdiction over the ... visitation ...
ofa child. In exercising its jurisdiction, the
court may . . . (4) Determine who shall
have visitation rights to a child;" MD.
CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §
3-602 (a) (1976). The court stated: "On its
face, therefore, section 3-604 (a) (4), prior
to the 1981 amendment, constituted the
broadest possible grant of authority to
courts to determine who shall be awarded
visitation rights." Evans v. Evans, 302
Md. at 339, 488 A.2d at 159.
The court then addressed the appellee's
contention that jurisdiction over visitation
must be construed narrowly in view of the
1981 amendment specifically providing
for grandparent's visitation rights. The
basis for the appellee's argument was that
the inclusion of a statutory provision specifically addressed to the visitation rights
of grandparents was a legislative recognition of the need to protect these rights. In
rejecting their argument, the court of appeals noted a long line of case law previously recognizing the right of grandparents
to custody and visitation rights. Powers v.
Hadden, 30 Md. App. 577, 353 A.2d 641
(1938).
The thrust of the court's reasoning, however, seems to turn on its examination of
the legislative history of the 1981 amendment to Section 3-602 (a) (4). A four year
effort had been present in the Maryland
Legislature to enact legislation to guarantee
visitation rights to grandparents. Evans,
302 Md. at 339-43, 408 A.2d at 159-61.
However these measures were repeatedly
defeated on the grounds that the existing
law adequately provided these rights.
The court agreed with the analysis of a
1984 decision by the court of appeals,
Skeens v. Paterno, 60 Md. App. 48, 480
A.2d 820(1984), wherein that court stated:
"The legislative history contains no indication that the bill was intended as a limitation on grandparental visitation or on
anyone else's visitation - in other contexts ... " Id at 60-61, 480 A.2d at 826.
The court's decision in Evans reaffirms
the longstanding test which has governed
Maryland custody and visitation cases,
namely, what is in the best interests of the
child. See Elza v. Elza, 300 Md. 51,475
A.2d 1180 (1984); Hild v. Hild, 221 Md.
349,157 A.2d442 (1960); Carterv. Carter,
156 Md. 500, 144 A. 490 (1929). Evans
makes it clear that the Maryland courts
have considerable discretion in determining who shall be awarded child visitation
rights, and explicitly are not limited to natural or adoptive parents or grandparents.
-M. Tracy Neuhauser
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u.s. v. Johns: THE AUTOMOBILE
EXCEPTION ONE STEP FURTHER
The Supreme Court through Justice
O'Connor in a 7-2 decision extended the
rule of law of United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798 (1982), which stated that once
police officers have probable cause to
search a lawfully stopped vehicle, they
may open and search closed containers
found within the vehicle that may conceal
the object of their search. In United States
v. Johns, 105 S.Ct. 881 (1985), the Supreme Court held that a search is not unreasonable, and therefore not violative of
the fourth amendment, "merely" because
the warrantless search of closed containers
takes place several days after the containers are removed from the vehicles.
In the course of an investigation of drug
smuggling operations, custom agents by
airborne and surface surveillance observed
the rendezvous between several pickup
trucks and an airplane at a remote airstrip
50 miles from the Mexican border. At
trial the surface agents stated that they
could not see what transpired, but were

told by airborne units that the trucks approached and parked near the small plane.
The officers closed in on the trucks, observed an individual covering the containers with a blanket, and smelled the odor
of marihuana. In the back of the trucks
were containers wrapped in dark green
plastic and sealed with tape. The respondents were then arrested. Neither the containers nor the trucks were searched at the
scene but instead they were taken to the
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
headquarters. The containers were unloaded from the trucks and placed in a
DEA warehouse; three days later a warrantless search revealed the marihuana.
At trial the respondents were successful
in suppressing the evidence, and this was
affirmed by the court of appeals, United
States v. Johns, 707 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir.
1983).
The Court summarily disposed of the
respondents first contention that the officer's probable cause to suspect contraband
went to the containers not the vehicles.
This distinction is important; if probable
cause went to the containers, the rule in
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1
(1977), would invalidate the warrantless
search as outside of the automobile exception first set forth in Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), but if the
probable cause went to the vehicle, the·
only issue is whether the rule in Ross,
should apply to a three day delay in an
otherwise lawful search. The Court did
not disturb the findings of fact of the
lower court and agreed that the officers
had probable cause that not only the packages, but also the vehicle contained the
drugs. See United States v. Johns, 707 F.2d
1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 1983).
The Court appeared to break the case
into two steps. First, that Ross, allowed
police officers to open and search closed
containers found in the execution of a
warrantless automobile search. Second,
that Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42
(1970), allowed vehicle searches at the police station that could have taken place at
the place of the vehicle stop. Therefore,
the Court simply stated, "as the Government was entitled to seize the packages
and could have searched them immediately without a warrant, we conclude that
the warrantless search three days later ...
was reasonable .... " Johns, 105 S.Ct. at
887.
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